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STATE OF UTAH 
MATTHEW PAGANO, C A R M E N 
PAGANO and MILLEO PAGANO, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
MARY P. WALKER, 




STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by Plaintiffs against their 
sister, the Defendant, to impress a constructive trust upon 
certain proceeds placed in joint-tenancy accounts by 
Plaintiffs' and Defendant's mother in her own name and 
in the name of the Defendant, Mary P. Walker. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court with an advisory 
jury. From a verdict by the Jury and Judgment by tihe 
Court in favor of the Plaintiffs, Defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the Judgment of the 
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Lower Court and for a Judgment in her favor as a 
matter of law, or that failing for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs and Defendant are sons and daughter 
of one Lucy Pagano who died on the 12th day of June, 
1972. Lucy and her husband immigrated to Utah where 
they, by hard labor and shrewd investments, accumu-
lated a sizeable estate in joint tenancy between them. 
At the death of Lucy's husband, Lucy then became the 
sole owner of all of the accumulations of property as the 
surviving joint tenant. Lucy was thus familiar with the 
legal implications of a joint-tenant estate. All of the 
children had worked with their parents during part of 
their lives (TR 24 L 21-30; TR 25, L 1-12). After the 
death of Lucy's husband, Lucy then caused certain ac-
counts to be set up between herself and her daughter, 
the Defendant Mary P. Walker, as joint tenants with 
full rights of survivorship and nothing more. The only 
evidence offered in tJiis respect was the pass books and 
the statement by the Defendant that as each one of the 
accounts were set up they were explained to Lucy and 
Mary by the bank officials receiving the deposit (TR 
49 L 16-30; TR 50 L 1-11; TR 181 L 12-30; TR 182 L 
1-16). There were no reservations or representations 
made by Lucy as each of the accounts were established 
altering or limiting the joint tenancy arrangements. 
Lucy also placed some water stock in her name and one 
of the Plaintiffs as joint tenants. She also caused to be 
made a Last Will and Testament, and left an estate to 
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be probated and divided among her children (TR 50 L 
17-30). 
The evidence shows that Plaintiffs from time to time 
visited with their mother, and Lucy from time to time 
made certain gifts to Plaintiffs and Defendant in differ-
ing sums. Evidence further shows that Mary was and 
is suffering from arthritis, which is progressively becom-
ing more and more serious; and that Lucy was aware of 
her condition (TR 18 L 14-21). Mary spent a great deal 
of time with Lucy — took her to the banks, assisted 
her in all of her business ventures, called her almost 
every day ,and spent much more time with her than any 
of the Plaintiffs (TR 30 L 1-24). Defendant made with-
drawals during Lucy's lifetime and afterward. Lucy died 
in 1972 and the Will of Lucy was duly admitted to pro-
bate in the District Court of Weber County and is now 
in the process of being probated, involving the property 
designated in her will (TR 50 L 17-30; TR 51, L 1-17). 
The joint-tenancy accounts between Lucy and the De-
fendant were not listed in the probate and Defendant 
claimed to be the owner of the same as the surviving 
joint tenant. Shortly after Lucy's death Plaintiffs claim 
that Defendant stated to them, "Mother told me to pay 
her personal bills, keep a little out for my arthritis and 
divide up the rest." Defendant denies that die ever 
made this statement, but rather told her brothers, the 
Plaintiffs, that if they would not cause trouble she would 
consider giving them a part of the money she claimed 
by right of survivorship in the joint-tenancy bank ac-
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counts on her own, but that she would decide if, when, 
and how much (TR 193 L 17-29; TR 194 L 1-7; TR 54 
L 8-14; TR 59 L 19-28). The Court submitted the matter 
to the Jury on the question: "Do you find it proven 
by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant, 
Mary P. Walker, shortly after her mother's death, made 
the following statement in the presence of other family 
members, 'Mother told me to pay her personal bills, keep 
a little out for my arthritis and divide up the rest.'?" The 
Jury then returned the verdict unanimously as "yes." 
The Court then requested written memoranda from coun-
sel, and set the matter for further hearing on the 29th 
day of July, 1974, where evidence was taken showing 
that Defendant did in fact have arthritis to a rather 
serious degree. That the doctor would anticipate it would 
become progressivley worse and the cost of treatment 
would become progressively higher (Dr. Ward TR 277-
290). The matter was again submitted to the Court; the 
Court made its Judgment accepting the answer of the 
July to the interrogatory, impressed a trust upon the 
funds in joint tenancy with Defendant, denied Defendant 
any amount for her arthritis, and ordered the money in 
the accounts to be divided equally among the parties. 
During the course of the trial Defendant offered evi-
dence through her witness, Lynn A. Walker, husband of 
the Defendant and coadministrator of the Lucy Pagano 
Estate, concerning whether or not Lucy had ever stated 
that she did not want iher sons to know about the hank 
accounts in question (TR 253 L 14-19), and again made 
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a proffer of evidence to the effect that the said Lynn A. 
Walker would testify that prior to her death Lucy had 
stated: "Here are the books, Mary. The boys are just 
waiting for me to die; they want to get their hands on 
some of this money, but I want you to pay my personal 
bills. And after that the rest of the money is yours." The 
Court refused the proffer of evidence on the theory that 
he was an interesited party and, hence, disqualified under 
ithe provisions of the Deadman's Statute (TR 55 L 1-8; 
TR 269 L 16-29). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT 
THE FINDING OF THE COURT BY CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE T H A T 
THE DEFENDANT, MARY P. WALKER, 
STATED: "MOTHER TOLD ME TO PAY 
HER PERSONAL BILLS, KEEP A LITTLE 
OUT FOR MY ARTHRITIS AND DIVIDE 
UP THE REST." 
In reviewing all of the testimony offered and re-
ceived in this matter, the only evidence that could sup-
port the Court's finding is that testimony of Plaintiffs, 
Carmen, Pagano, Matthew Pagano, Milleo Pagano, and 
the wife of Milleo Pagano, Margaret, alleging that Mary 
Walker, the Defendant, stated to them the words set out 
above. Mary Walker has vigorously denied ever making 
the statement attributed to her above, and her husband, 
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Lynn A. Walker, testified that he had never heard her 
make this statement although he had been with her dur-
ing the times referred to by the Plaintiffs. 
I t is well established in Utah, that in order to alter 
or avoid the terms of a written, joint-tenancy account, 
or to impress a trust upon such accounts as against the 
surviving joint tenant, that the evidence must be dear 
and convincing. It is also well established that the clear 
and convincing evidence must be evidence of the intent 
of the parties establishing the joint-tenancy accounts 
from their own funds at the date of the creation of the 
joint-tenancy accouiut. In other words, if Lucy Pagano 
established a joint-tenancy account with the Defendant, 
Mary Walker, by signing the joint^tenancy contracts with 
the various banking institutions and there is no evidence 
of any other intent at the time of the creation of such 
accounts, as is the case here, then such accounts must 
stand. We submit there is nothing further offered by 
Plaintiffs to substantiate their admission, and to the con-
trary, other evidence indicated that it was extremely 
unlikely that the Defendant, Mary P. Walker, had made 
this statement. 
In reviewing the evidence, it should be noted, and 
this was not controverted by any of the parties to this 
suit, (1) that Lucy, the mother of the parties, received 
most of her property by way of joint tenancy with her 
deceased husband; (2) it was admitted that during her 
lifetime Lucy had made various gifts to each of her child-
ren and the gifts were never made in the exact amount 
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to each of them; (3) each of the children spent varying 
times with their mother, both in personal visitations and 
work on the farm; (4) Lucy Pagano not only created 
the joint-tenancy accounts in the Defendant, Mary P. 
Walker,, and her alone, but also in addition, left an 
estate to be probated where the property was in her 
name alone, so that all of her children, Plaintiffs and 
Defendant Mary P. Walker, would receive properties 
from such estate; and (5) the only evidence brought 
before the Court was that at the time Lucy Pagano cre-
ated the joint-tenancy accounts and signed the agree-
ments with the banks, each time one was created the 
official handling the transaction read the joint-tenancy 
agreement to Lucy and she understood the same and 
signed each of them, and made no written or verbal limi-
tation on any of them. There was no other evidence of 
a contrary intent offered by Plaintiffs at any time. All 
of these facts, together with the reasonable inferences 
arising therefrom, we feel should make it obvious that 
Lucy did not, at the time she created the joint-tenancy 
accounts with the Defendant, Mary P. Walker, intend 
to divide all of her property equally among her children. 
It seems obvious that she did not create a constructive 
trust with the funds in said joint bank accounts, and 
with this in mind it would seem obvious that Mary P. 
Walker would not have said the words put into her mouth 
by individuals who would profit by such words. Mary 
vigorously denied having made the alleged statement, 
stating that she had, in effect, told them that if they did 
not cause trouble for her she would consider setting 
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aside some of the funds left to her in the joint-tenancy 
accounts and divide them with her brothers as she saw 
fit. I t would seem that Defendant, Mary P. Walker, 
rightfully anticipated that if her brothers found that she 
was left funds outside of the estate of Lucy Pagano they 
would cause her trouble, and her fears were borne out, 
as is evidenced by their conduct. We submit that as a 
matter of law the Plaintiffs did not prove this necessary 
allegation by clear and convincing evidence or even by 
a preponderance of the evidence. The law is not such 
that the Court must give a Judgment based upon the 
number of witnesses testifying for versus the number 
of witnesses testifying against, and it is our position that 
had the Count given proper consideration to the admitted 
facts and circumstances surrounding this case its ruling 
would have been different. The testimony of Lynn 
Walker should have been admitted, since he was not a 
disqualified witness and his offered testimony was rele-
van and competent. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT 
THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT 
THAT THERE WAS A CONSTRUCTIVE 
TRUST ON THE FUNDS PLACED IN 
JOINT-TENANCY BY LUCY P A G A N O 
WITH HERSELF AND THE DEFENDANT, 
MARY P. WALKER. 
The only possible basis for the establishment of a 
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constructive trust on the joint-tenancy funds would be 
the statement allegedly made by Mary P. Walker, the 
Defendant. If it is determined that Mary did not in fact 
make such a statement, then the claim by Plaintiffs 
that a constructive trust was established must fail. There 
was absolutely no other evidence to support such a claim. 
Even if it is found that Mary did make such a state-
ment, the claim of a constructive trust still must fail as 
a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs, at the time of trial, amended their Com-
plaint and admitted that Lucy Pagano did in fact set up 
joint-tenancy accounts with Defendant, Mary P. Walker, 
and that Mary became the owner of the money, but then 
claim that sometime later her ownership became that 
of a trustee. We respectfully submit that at this time 
the transfer was made to Lucy and Mary and they in 
fact were the joint owners of the funds and could not 
later change the legal relationship to one of a trust with-
out Mary's consent. 
There is absolutely no evidence offered by Plaintiffs 
to show that Lucy later attempted to set up a trust, or 
that Mary agreed to a trust relationship. There is no 
evidence as to when Lucy might have tried to do so, or 
that Mary might have consented to do so. 
In Restatement of Trusts, 2d, ch. 2 §25, the rule is 
stated as follows: 
" (a) The test. The rule stated in this section 
is applicable although the settlor has called the 
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transaction a trust. No trust is created unless 
he manifests an intention to impose duties which 
aire enforceable in the Courts. 
(b) Precatory words. On the one hand a set-
tlor may manifest an intention to create a trust; 
on the other h*ind his manifestation of intention 
may amount merely to a suggestion or a wish 
that the transferee should use or dispose of the 
property in a certain manner leaving it to the 
transferee to follow the suggestion or comply 
with the wish only if the transferee desires to 
do so. No trust is created if the settlor manifests 
an intention to impose a merely, moral obliga-
tion. In determining the intention of the settlor 
the following circumstances, among others, are 
considered: (1) the imperative or precatory 
character of the words used; (2) the definiteness 
or indefiniteness of the property; (3) the def-
initeness or the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries 
or of the extent of their interest * * *." 
In Re^tatemente of Trusts, 2d, ch. 2 §38 (1), the 
text states as follows; 
"If the owner of property transfers it intervivos 
to another person by an instrument in which it 
is declared that the transferee is to take the 
property for his own benefit, extrinsic evidence, 
in the absence of fraud, duress, mistake, or other 
ground for reformation or recession is not ad-
missible to show that he was intended to hold 
the property in trust." 
If the owner of property transferred it intervivos 
to another person as trastee, a trust may be created, but 
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no evidence was introduced by plaintiffs to this effect. 
All of the deposits were made by Lucy to herself and 
Mary Walker as individuals with no reservation or indi-
cation of trusteeship or declaration thereof. Defendant's 
testimony was that at no time did she ever understand 
or intend the money in the joint-tenancy accounts to be 
held in trust. To the contrary, she stated, according to 
her testimony which was never disputed, that the money 
was hers and that if there was no trouble she would see 
about giving the plaintiffs, on her own, some of it. This 
is a far cry from a statement or declaration of trust. She 
stated further that she had done everything her mother 
had asked her to do — keep it (TR 193 L 15-22). 
A gift once made remains a gift and cannot be re-
trieved in whole or in part without the consent of the 
giver and the givee. 
Giving full credence to the evidence offered by plain-
tiffs we feel their allegation that Mary holds the funds 
in trust must fail. They have shown that their mother 
understood the implications of joint-tenancy accounts 
through her husband's estate; that she had made previ-
ous gifts to the children in unequal amounts; had placed 
other property in her name and one of the sons as joint 
tenants; and had left other property in her name alone 
to be distributed under the terms of her will. 
To alter or defeat the creation of a joint-tenancy 
account as established by Lucy agano with the Defen-
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dant, Mary Walker, and to create a constructive trust 
from such a joint-tenancy account, Plaintiffs must do 
so by clear and convincing evidence. 
There have been a great number of cases defining 
"clear and convincing proof." In Words and Phrases, 
Vol. 7, p. 603, and in the pocket supplement there is 
quoted many cases,, including a Utah case defining the 
words "clear and convincing" as "evidence to be clear 
and convincing must be such that there is no serious or 
substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion." 
[Emphasis ours.] Norther est, Inc. v. Walker Bank and 
Trust Company, (1950), 122 Utah 268, 248 P. 2d 692, 
698. 
The Colorado Supreme Court has defined "clear and 
convincing evidence'3 as follows: "Clear and convincing 
evidence is evidence which is stronger than a preponder-
ance of the evidence and which is unmistakable and free 
from serious or substantial doubt" [Emphasis ours.] 
Dahman v. Ford Leasing Development Company, 492 
P. 2d 875, 877. 
New Mexico — "Evidence is clear and convincing in 
support of the essential elements of deceipt only if it in-
stantly tilts the scales in the affirmative on each element, 
when weighed against evidence in opposition and fact 
finders mind is left with an abiding conviction that 
charges as to each element are proved." Hackett v. Winks, 
485 P. 2d 353, 355. [Emphasis ours.] 
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Illinois — "Clear and convincing evidence is that 
quantum of proof which leaves no reasonable doubt in 
the minds of the trier of facts of truth of facts in issue" 
In re Weaver's Estate, 220 N. E. 2d 321, 322. [Emphasis 
ours.] 
California — "Clear and convincing evidence is that 
evidence which is so clear, explicit and unequivocal as to 
leave no substantial doubt which is sufficiently strong 
to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable 
mind" Petition of Jost, 256 P. 2d 71, 74. 
These definitions of "clear and convincing" evidence 
seem to be generally withi nthe definitions accepted and 
required by our law. 
In a recent and similar case decided by the Utah 
Supreme Court in 1972 — Del Porto v. Nicola, 27 Utah 
2d 286, 495 P. 2d 811, the facte were as follows: Angelina 
and Delbert Del Porto were of Italian origin, came into 
this country from Italy and were frugal and industrious. 
They had reared their family of three children and had 
acquired a rather sizeable estate. The children had 
worked with their parents in accumulating the property. 
(These facts are almost exactly the facts in the case 
before this Court at this time.) Angelina had deeded 
certain real property to her son and daughter-in-law. Sub-
sequently, her husband, Delbert, passed away and a suit 
was filed by Delbert's administrator against the deced-
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ent's son and daughter-in-law to recover certain of the 
real property theretofore deeded to them by Angelina. 
The Court, in refusing to impose a constructive trust for 
the other heirs of t^he Del Portos noted "a plenitude of 
conflicting evidence" but found that all of the deeds were 
made by Angelina while she was competent and there 
was no fraud, duress, or undue influence involved; that 
they were properly delivered and therefore there was 
no intent to create a trust for the other heirs. Thene was 
a considerable amount of evidence in support of Plain-
tiff's contention in the Del Porto case, but virtually none 
in the instant case t>efore this Court. 
In another similar case our Supreme Court stated: 
"It is true that where an intention to create a joint-ten-
ancy is clearly expressed in a written contract executed 
by the parties which remains unaltered, and there is no 
evidence of fraud, undue influence, mistake or other in-
firmity, the question of intention ceasces to be an issue 
and the courts are bound by the agreement." First Se-
curity Bank of Utah v. Burgi, 122 Utah 445, 251 P. 2d 
297. Once again, this case is similar to the one before 
the Court at this time. The contracts were clear, they 
were written, executed by the parties, and theore is ab-
solutely no evidence of fraud, undue influence, mistake, 
or other infirmity. This case presents merely a question 
of law, and the Court need not accord any favored posi-
tion to the trial court. Makoff, Trustees, v. Makoff, 
Utah 2d , Case No. 13577 (Filed Nov. 19, 1974). 
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In Jewel v. Horner, 12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P. 2d 594, 
decided by our Supreme Court in 1961, the facts show 
that Plaintiffs were brothers of the Defendant, Ethel 
Homer. The p a r t e ' father had deeded property to the 
Defendant at the time he was considering remarriage 
after the death of his wife. The deed from the father 
to the Defendant, Ethel, purported to convey the prop-
erty to Ethel for Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good 
and valuable consideration, subject to a life estate re-
served to the grantor, and in the event of remarriage a 
life estate in his wife. The evidence adduced by Plain-
tiffs was testimony from a Mr. Jensen, a realtor and 
friend of the Jewel family, that Mr. Jewel had stated 
that he wanted to keep the property away from his 
proposed second wife and he wanted the property to go 
to his children. One of the Plaintiffs, Clarence Jewel, 
Jr., testified to three conversations with his father — 
once again as in the present case, self-serving, wherein 
the father purportedly told him that the home would 
eventually go to the boys. That he, the father, was going 
to divide up the property among the boys and that he 
was going to put the deed in Ethel's name for safekeeping 
for her and the boys, so that his proposed wife would not 
be able to touch it. Clarence's testimony was also to the 
effect that there had been a number of discussions prior 
to the father's death that it was the general understand-
ing that the deed was given to Ethel to insure that the 
property would remain in the family and equally shared 
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by all. The Plaintiff, Jessie M. Jewel, testified as to 
two specific conversations with the father. One was to 
the effect that the father was planning to get married 
and would make a deed out to Ethel for safe-keeping, or 
to be held so that the second wife would not have a 
chance to ge in on it, and to keep the property for the 
family — for Ethel and the boys. The second conversa-
tion was allegedly to the effect that the father was happy 
that he had taken aire of the deed to keep the property 
for the family so that the children of his second wife 
could not claim an interest therein. Plaintiff, Argel Jew-
el stated that he had conversations with the father, 
wherein his father indicated that he would split up the 
ground between the boys and give Ethel the portion with 
the home on it. Jewel also testified that the father stated 
he had placed the home in Ethers name in trust for all 
of the children, and o^er the years there had been many 
conversations, in substance — that the house was left in 
Ethers name in trust for the whole family with a home 
for her to Eve in as long as she wished. In behalf of De-
fendant, Ethel, Plaintiff's witness, Vaughn Soffe, a fun-
eral director, stated that he had had a conversation with 
the father, and Mr. Soffe stated that the father led him 
to believe Ethel was to have the home. Ethel herself 
denied that her father had ever stated she was to have 
the property in safe-ke*3ping or trust for herself and her 
brothers. She stated the deed was made exactly as her 
father had desired, with no trust to be imposed upon 
the same. The trial court imposed the trust upon the 
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property and this Court reversed the same; in so doing, 
the Court stated: 
"This case is one in equity, the dominant ques-
tion here is whether the Plaintiffs by dear, con-
vincing, and satisfactory proof established the 
alleged parole trust with respect to the real 
property. The trial court so found and this 
Court upon review should not set aside the find-
ing of the lower Court unless it manifestiy ap-
pears that the lower court has misapplied proven 
facts or that the finding is clearly against the 
weight of the evidence. For the reasons to be 
stated we are of the opinion that the trial court's 
finding of a parole trust is clearly against the 
weight of the evidence and must be set aside. 
"The transfer of his home by father to Ethel 
was made by a deed absolute subject to life es-
tates and authorities are practically uniform to 
the point that to justify a court in determining 
from oral testimony that a deed which purports 
to convey land absolutely in fee simple was in-
tended to be something different, such as a 
trust, such testimony must be clear and convinc-
ing. The proof must be something more than 
that modicum of evidence which this Court 
sometimes holds to be sufficient to warrant a 
finding where the matter is not so serious as the 
overthrow of a clearly expressed deed solemnly 
executed and delivered. 
"With respect to the standard and quality of 
evidence required to establish an oral trust, the 
court in the case of Chambers v. Emery stated: 
Tn such even the proof must be strong, clear 
and convincing such as to leave no doubt as to 
the existence of the trust. Such a case is simi-
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lar to one where it is attempted to convert a 
deed absolute into a mortgage or where the refor-
mation of a written instrument is sought on the 
grounds of accident, mistake or fraud. In all 
such cases the court will scrutinize parole evi-
dence with great caution and the Plaintiff must 
fail unless it is clear, definitely unequivocal, and 
conclusive. Public policy and the safety and 
security of titles to real estate demand this rule 
because such evidence is offered to overcome 
the strong presumption arising from problems 
and conditions of an instrument in writing, which 
is always the best evidence of title. / / it were 
once established that the effect of the terms of 
a written instrument could be avoided by a bare 
preponderance of parole evidence the gates to 
perjury would soon be wide open and no person 
could longer rest in the security of title to his 
property, however solemn might be the instru-
ment upon which it was founded.9" [Emphasis 
OURS.] 
The Court also reflected upon the fact that much of 
the testimony was vague and self-serving and was subject 
to the infirmities enumerated in the case of Chambers 
v. Emery, 13 Utah 374, 45 P. 192, where the Court stated 
that it is unsatisfactory and dangerous to depend wholly 
upon recollection of witnesses who might have improper 
or corrupt motives and may represent the deceased as 
having expressed ideas precisely reverse of that which 
was intended by him. 
I t appears that the Jewel v. Horner case, supra, had 
facts much stronger to support Plaintiffs' contentions 
than those found in this particular case, and yet this 
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Court reversed the lower court. Once again, in this in-
stant case the only evidence to show a contrary intention 
on the part of Lucy Pagano is the alleged statement 
claimed to have been made by Mary, the Defendant, 
after the death of Lucy, whidti statement is vigorously 
denied. There was no evidence at all adduced by Plain-
tiffs that Lucy intended other than a joint-tenancy ac-
count with all of the legal implications thereof at the 
time of the creation of the joint-tenancy accounts with 
Defendant. Even if in fact Lucy Pagano later had in-
dicated a desire that Mary keep a little out for her ar-
thritis and divide up the rest, this would not amount to 
a legal over-throwing of the once established joint-ten-
ancy account. Once that account had been established, 
legally, with no reservations in the written instrument 
between Lucy Pagano, Defendant, and the banks, they 
could only be modified by an agreement by all three 
parties, and there was absolutely no evidence of this hap-
pening offered into this case; certainly there was no evi-
dence offered that Defendant ever accepted any trust, 
or that she held the deposits in trust. 
In a case very similar to this one at issue, decided 
by our Supreme Court December 22, 1969, Woodward 
v. Monson, 23 Utah 2d 318, 462 P. 2d 715, wherein the 
heirs of a decedent brought an action to obtain their pro-
portionate share of a bank account which had been cre-
ated by the decedent with his daughter named as a 
joint tenant, the Court reversed the lower court and once 
again stated the law in Utah: 
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"There is a presumption that joint^tenancy sur-
vivorship bank accounts create joint-tenancy with 
full rights of survivorship, and that the heirs of 
the decedent had failed to establish that joint-
tenancy survivoorship account opened by the de-
cedent prior to his death with his daughter 
named as a joint tenant was intended for con-
venience or business necessities of the decedent, 
and therefore the balance of the account became 
the sole property of the daughter through rights 
of survivorship at the decedent's death." 
In a very recent Utah Supreme Court case entitled 
Nelson v. Nelson, Administrator, 30 Utah 2d 80, 513 P. 
2d 1011, the Court made the following statement: 
"The relationship of parent and child does not 
constitute such confidential relationship as to 
create a presumption of fraud or undue influence. 
The evidence in tliis case is insufficient to show 
a reposal of confidence by one party and the 
resulting superiority and influence on the other 
party." 
In refusing to set aside a conveyance from the deceased 
to his daughter, the Court stated: 
"The Plaintiff has the burden of proof proving 
with clear and convincing proof that the convey-
ance from Virgil to Teresa was obtained by fraud 
and that Homer either participated in the fraud 
or had knowledge of it." [Emphasis ours.] 
The significance of this case is the fact that the Court 
has once again stated that the Plaintiff has the burden 
of proving by a clear and convincing proof. 
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Our Supreme Court, in Spader v. Newbold, 29 Utah 
2d 433, 511 P. 2d 153, reaffirmed the position in previous 
oases and refused to set aside a joint-tenancy account 
for the other heirs. The Court stated: 
"Since she was protected by the prerogative of 
relying on the universally accepted principle that 
joint-tenancy documents be they bonds, bank or 
savings accounts, deeds, negotiable instrument, 
or the like, mean what they say and are invul-
nerable to any other meaning until attacked by 
someone. The latter, representing the Plaintiffs 
here, carries the burden of proving otherwise. 
Such proof must be by dear and convincing evi-
dence * * *." 
We submit that the Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, 
failed to prove a constructive trust and the trial court 
erred in finding such. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ORDER OF 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE FUNDS IN JOINT 
TENANCY WITH LUCY PAGANO AND DE-
FENDANT, MARY P. WALKER, AND RE-
FUSAL TO AWARD ANY SUM TO DEFEN-
DANT FOR HER ARTHRITIS. 
If, for the sake of the argument, Mary P. Walker 
did in fact make the statement attributed to her by 
Plaintiffs, and if as the Court decided that there resulted 
a constructive trust, it is the Defendant's position that 
the Court erred in making a distribution as it did in the 
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joint-tenancy accounts. Furthermore if the Court did 
not err in distributing said funds ,then it is the position 
of the Defendant that the Court erred in refusing to set 
aside a sum to the Defendant for hear arthritis before 
dividing up the accounts as it did. 
We claim that the statement allegedly made by the 
Defendant, Mary P. Walker, which she categorically de-
nies: "Mother told me to pay the bills, keep a little out 
for my arthritis and divide up the rest," is (1) so vague 
and indefinite that it is unenforceable, and (2) such 
words are precatory only and would only contribute an 
expression of a hope or a desire rather than a legal man-
date to do so. See In re Milton's Estate, 294 P. 2d 412. 
Before giving effect to the alleged statement, the 
Court must be able from competent evidence admitted 
to determine (1) how much is "a little for my arthritis" 
and determine the in/tent of Lucy if she made the state-
ment "divide up the rest." The record is devoid of any 
evidence upon which the Court could determine Lucy's 
intent if she in fact made this statement, and if the 
statement is to be given any legal effect; we submit that 
the finding was arbitrary, capricious, and not based on 
competent evidence. 
The evidence is that Lucy knew that Mary had 
arthritis; that she was being medically treated for the 
same; that it would probably worsen as Mary grew older. 
The only other evidence bearing on it at all was the fact 
that Lucy had from time to time during her lifetime 
made gifts not in equal amounts to her children and that 
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she left a Will covering a part of her estate to be pro-
bated and divided among her children. No mention of 
these deposits was made in the Will. All of these factors 
together would make it necessary for the Court to guess 
and pull out of thin air, its own interpretation what was 
meant by the statement. We submit the Court did not 
have sufficient or any facts upon which to make its 
ruling. The phrase "keep a little out for my arthritis" 
could mean anything from one cent up, (whose guess 
would be correct?) and if the Court accepts the state-
ment allegedly made by Mary it must give credence to 
all of the statement. The Court arbitrarily gave credence 
to one part of the claimed statement, but arbitrarily 
refused to give credence to the other. 
The phrase "divide up the rest" is likewise vague 
and ambiguous. Does this mean divide up the rest equally 
or does it mean divide up the resit upon the percentages 
or with the differences as evidenced by past gifts given 
by Lucy to her children during her lifetime — does it 
mean among all of her children or some of her children, 
or if one of her children had died leaving issue were they 
to be included? We submit there is no evidence from which 
the Court could make a determination as to what this 
phrase meant in the absence of evidence bearing upon it. 
The Court's finding was based upon an arbitrary, capri-
cious, or conjectural construction by the Court, not upon 
evidence of the party allegedly making the statement. 
With respect to the Court's right to second guess the 
parties or give legal effect to a situation which is so vague 
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and ambiguous, one of the early cases is an Illinois case, 
Young v. Farewell, (1892), 146 111. App. 299. In this case 
the Court was called upon to decide the meaning of the 
following words: "We will divide with you all of the profits 
made over the last percentages," and "I will divide with 
you all of the profits which your department makes over 
your past average percentages of profit." In its attempt 
to deteamine the meaning of the word "divide" as well as 
the meaning of the phrases themselves, the Court stated 
that an agreement to divide does not necessarily mean to 
divide equally and it is uncertain from the whole contract 
that such was the intention of the parties. Also the Court, 
in commenting upon the uncertainties of the verbal state-
ment, commented as follows: 
"The Courts may and should in cases of doubt 
give to words amtractually employed, such mean-
ing as will effectuate the intention of the parties 
when such intention may be gathered from all of 
the circumstances surrounding the transaction, 
but when from a consideration of all the circum-
stances it is impossible to determine when the 
minds of the contracting parties met, the contract 
must fail. We also think the contract must fail 
because of other indefiniteness." 
The final statement made by the Court which we feel 
was and is the law, and properly so, was as follows: 
"It is not the province of the Courts to make con-
tracts for parties, nor to make certain and definite 
what parties have left uncertain and indefinite 
unless their intention is clearly and satisfactorily 
proven." 
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We feel this law, although decided long ago, is the proper 
law in this case. 
Although we have been unable to find a case exactly 
in point with the instant case, we feel there have been a 
number of Utah decisions analogous to it. In re Beals Es-
tate, 117 Utah 189, 214 P. 2d 525, construing a Will, this 
Court said: 
"The rule of construction that the intent of the 
testator must be carried out does not authorize 
courts to make a new Will to conform to what 
they think the testator intended, but the intent 
of the testator must be ascertained in a Will as 
it stands.'9 [Emphasis ours.] 
The logical conclusion would be, then, that should the 
intent of the testator not be determinable then that 
must fail. 
In a landmark Utah case, Chambers v. Emery, supra, 
the Court set forth the rule with respect to giving legal 
effect to vague and uncertain statements, and especially 
with the dangers of parol evidence. The Court said: 
"In such event the proof must be strong, clear 
and convincing such as to leave no doubt as to 
the existence of the trusts * * *. In all 
such cases the court will scrutinize all parol 
evidence with great caution and the plaintiff 
must fail unless it is clear, definite, un-
equivocal and conclusive * * *. If it were 
once established that the effects of the terms of 
a written instrument could be avoided by bare 
preponderance of parol evidence the gates to 
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perjury would soon be wide open and no person 
could longer rest in the security of his title to 
property however solemn might be the instru-
ment upon which it was founded." [Emphasis 
ours.] 
We submit this case is completely in point with 
the case before this Court where written joint-tenancy 
contracts were discussed, explained and made; Plaintiffs 
now are attempting to modify the terms or destroy the 
creation of the joint- tenancy accounts by parol evidence, 
which was completely self-serving. 
In Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P. 2d 427, 
the Court said: 
"A condition precedent to the enforcement of 
any contract is that there is a meeting of the 
minds of the parties which must be spelled out 
either expressly or impliedly with sufficient 
definiteness to be enforced * * *. The Court 
cannot fabricate the kind of contract the par-
ties ought to have made and then enforce it." 
[Emphasis ours.] 
A North Carolina case, Broadhurst v. Newborn, 88 
S. E. 628, the Court held that it was the intention of 
the testator that governs and it is not the Court's duty 
nor its right to second guess the intent of the testator. 
A Washington case, In re Milton's Estate, supra, 
the Court held that a statement in the Will that it was 
"contemplated that the money for the debts of the es-
tate would come from the proceeds of insurance" were 
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mere precatory words of the testator and insufficient to 
be binding, and that such were nothing more than a wish 
or a desire or expectation by the testator. 
In Breckenridge v. Krocker, (Cal.), 21 P. 179, the 
Court stated as follows: 
"But to whatever form of action resort may be 
had, the burden is on the plaintiff to show by 
the writings that a contract definite and certain 
by its terms was entered into by the parties, and 
failing to do that he must fail to obtain relief." 
In a California case, Inn Association v. Phillips, 56 
Cal. 546, the Court stated: "A Court of equity will not 
specifically enforce any contract unless it is completed 
and certain." 
Another California case, McGee v. McManus, 12 P. 
451, states as follows: 
"A thing agreed to be done must be definite and 
certain in its terms and in itself and the party 
who claims performance must make out by clear 
and satisfactory proof the existence of the con-
tract as he alleges it." 
In Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P. 2d 
491, the Court said: 
"Specific performance cannot be required un-
less all terms of the agreement are clear. The 
Court cannot compel the performance of a con-
tract which the parties did not mutually agree 
upon." [Emphasis ours.] 
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The Court cited a Colorado case, Boman v. Rayburn, 
170 P. 2d 271, and quoted 71 American Jurisprudence 
2d, Specific Performance, §22 p. 35, as follows: 
"A contract must be free from doubt, vagueness 
and ambiguities so as to leave nothing to con-
jecture or to be supplied by the Court. I t must 
be sufficiently certain and definite in its terms 
as to leave no reasonable doubt as to what the 
parties intended and no reasonable doubt of the 
specific thing equity is called upon to have per-
fbormed, and it must be sufficiently certain as to 
its terms so the court may enforce it as actually 
made by the parties." 
In Young v. Farewell, supra, the Court said: 
"When from a consideration of all of the circum-
stances it is impossible to determine what is in 
the mind of the (contracting parties the contract 
must fail." 
In Stoddard v. Montgomery, a Nebraska case, 98 
N. W. 2d 875, the Court was called upon to construe the 
meaning of a statute requiring the trial court to "divide" 
the attorneys' fees awarded in real property partition 
case among the attorneys of record. The Court after 
some learned discussion held that the word "divide" does 
not necessarily mean separate and equal parts. 
We submit that if somehow this Court should find 
that the Defendant did in fact make the statement at-
tributed to by her brothers and the wife of one brother, 
and if somehow a constructive trust was intended, even 
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so the Court could not properly make a division of the 
monies in the joint-tenancy accounts because in order 
to do so the Court would have to flip a coin, draw a 
number out of a hat, or make some other arbitrary de-
termination as to how much is "a little for my arthritis" 
and then guess as to what Lucy Pagano meant when she 
said "divide up the rest" — on what share basis, and 
with whom? We submit the Court should not and could 
not substitute its own thinking in order to cure a de-
ficiency created by one of the parties to an action, and 
as this Supreme Court has stated, In re Beat's Estate, 
supra, the Court does not have the right to make a new 
Will to conform to what they think the testator intended, 
or in the Broadhurst case, supra, it is not the Court's 
right nor its duty to second guess the intent of the testa-
tor, or as stated in Young v. Farewell, supra, decided 
before the turn of the century: 
"It is not the province of the Courts to 
make contracts for the parties and to make 
certain and definite what parties have left un-
certain and indefinite, unless their intention is 
clearly and satisfactorily proven." 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAIN-
ING O B J E C T I O N S TO DEFENDANT'S 
PROFFERED EVIDENCE. 
Defendant offered into evidence testimony concern-
ing the statements of Lucy Pagano relating to Lucy's 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
intentions with respect to the ownership of the funds 
pdaoed in the joint-tenancy accounts by her with the 
Defendant. The evidence was offered through Lynn A. 
Walker, husband of the Defendant, and son-in-law of 
the deceased^ Lucy Pagano. Mr. Walker was not di-
rectly interested in the outcome of the proceedings as 
contemplated by our deadman's statute. He would re-
ceive no money regardless of the outcome of this case and 
was not an heir or devisee of Lucy Pagano. 
Mr. Walker was first asked if Lucy had ever told 
him that she did not want her sons to know about the 
joint bank accounts involved. The Court sustained the 
objection of Plaintiffs Counsel, based upon the dead-
man's statute. Later Defendant made an offer of evi-
dence to the Court out of the hearing of the Jury. The 
offer of evidence being substantially that Lucy Pagano 
had stated to Mary and himself, as she gave Mary the 
pass books, that the boys were just waiting for her to 
die, that they wanted to get their hands on some of this 
money, that she wanted Mary to pay her personal bills, 
and after that, the balance of the money was to be hers, 
meaning Mary's. Once again the Court sustained the 
objection of Plaintiffs' Counsel to this offer of evidence, 
stating that it came within the purview of the dead-man's 
statute. Mr. Walker had testified that he had been with 
Mary Walker, the Defendant, on the occasions described 
by Plaintiffs, and Mary had never stated that she was 
told by her mother that she was to divide up the rest 
of the monies in the joint-tenancy accounts, and that 
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Mary had always indicated that her mother had given 
her the money — the only limitation was that Mary 
pay her personal bills. 
Our Deadman's Statute, 78-24-2 (3) Utah Code 
Annotated^ 1953, states as follows: 
"Who may not be witnesses. — The following 
persons cannot be witnesses * * * (3) a 
party to any civil action, suit, or pleading and 
any person directly interested in the event 
thereof, and any person from, through or under 
whom such party or interested person derived 
his interest or title or any pant thereof when 
the adverse party in such action or proceedings 
claims or opposes, sues or defends as guardian 
of an insane or incompetent person, or as the 
executor, or administrator, heir, legatee or de-
visee of any deceased person, or as guardian, 
assignee, or grantee directly or remotely of such 
heir, legatee or devisee as to any statement by 
or transaction with such deceased, insane or 
incompetent person, or matter of fact whatever, 
which must have been equally within the knowl-
edge of the witness and such insane, incompe-
tent or deceased person, unless such witness is 
called to testify thereto by such adverse party 
so daiming or opposing, suing or defending in 
such action, suit or proceeding." 
It is our position that Lynn A. Walker, who was not 
suing or defending, as guardian or Administrator, or Ex-
ecutor, or an heir and who would not receive any of the 
proceeds of the accounts in question is not precluded 
from testifying under this Statute. He had not received 
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any property that was involved in this action from Lucy 
Pagano and he would not receive any property involved 
in this suit regardless of the outcome thereof. As was 
stated in Maxfield v. Sainsbury, 110 Utah 280, 172 P. 
2d 122, 125, the purpose of the Statute was to get to the 
truth of the matters: 
"It was never intended that this section should 
be used for the purpose of suppressing the truth. 
On the contrary, the Statute's sole purpose is to 
prevent the proving by false testimony of claims 
against the estate of the deceased person." 
In this same case the Court went on to say: 
"If the witness is opposing or suing the Execu-
tor, or if the witness has a direct interest in the 
event of the suit a prohibition of the Statute 
applies." 
And further: 
"We think the legislature intended by the term 
'adverse party' to disqualify only those witnesses 
who have a direct interest in the event of that 
particular action, adverse to the interests of the 
estate. See Mowesr v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228 
p 911 * * v> 
In Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 2d 193, 381 P. 2d 78, 
decided by the Supreme Court in 1963, Plaintiff brought 
an action against the Executrix of the Estate of Leonard 
Derle Gardner. A witness, Blake Probert, was precluded 
from testifying as to facts that must have been equally 
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in the knowledge of both the witness and the deceased 
person. The witness also, had a similar claim against 
the estate. The trial Court permitted Probert to testify 
and the Court upheld the trial Court's ruling, stating: 
"While this Statute obviously has a salutary 
purpose in many instances its effect is to sup-
press inquiry into the truth rather than to assist 
in its discovery. For that reason this Court has 
heretofore indicated that it should be construed 
and applied strictly, and that it will only dis-
qualify a witness who has an interest in the par-
ticular subject matter of the action in which he 
is challenged as a witness. More specifically ap-
plicable to the issue before us is the holding in 
our case of Clark v. George, that in an action 
for specific performance the challenged witness 
must have a direct interest in the contract which 
was the subject matter of the action in order 
to fall under the ban of this Statute. 
The trial court correctly ruled that the fact that 
Probert had a claim of a similar nature against 
this estate would not disqualify him as a wit-
ness," 
CONCLUSION 
It is our contention that Lucy Pagano, mother of 
Plaintiffs and Defendant, was a knowledgeable person 
knowing full well the legal implications of a joint-ten-
ancy account, she herself having received her property 
through joint-tenancy accounts with her husband. Lucy 
opened the various joint-tenancy accounts (the subject 
matber of this suit) with the Defendant, her daughter 
Mary P. Walker, and at the time of the creation of these 
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joint-tenancy accounts there was no declaration or other 
indication they were to be held in trust for the Plaintiffs 
or any other person. We contend, the only evidence 
that the moneys in the said joint-<tenancy accounts were 
to be held in trust for the Plaintiffs was the alleged state-
ment made by Mary, which she vigorously denies. This 
evidence was, of course, self-serving on the part of Plain-
tiffs. When Defendant offered evidence through Lynn 
A. Walker of statements showing the true intent of Lucy 
Pagano with respect; to the joint-tenancy accounts, the 
Court refused to permit this evidence, which we feel was 
the only independent evidence to help ascertain the 
truth of the matter and what justice is all about. We 
feel the refusal to admit the evidence was error in that 
this was not a suit by or against an estate of the de-
ceased person and the witness had no direct interest 
in the outcome of the case. Plaintiffs did not offer any 
evidence as to when their mother was supposed to have 
made this statement to Mary, and it is our feeling that 
once the joint-tenancy was established with no showing 
of a trust relationship thiis could not be modified without 
the consent of Lucy, Mary, and the banks, on which 
point there was no evidence whatsoever. Even if this 
statement was made, it is our contention that it would 
not change the original terms of the joint^tenancy ac-
counts; that the statement would be so vague and am-
biguous as to be unenforceable even if made and that 
at the most the statement would have been a precatory 
statement rather than a legally enforceable trust 
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If the ruling of the lower Court should be upheld, 
there would be, as a practical maitter, no joint^tenancy 
account enforceable in the State of Utah — no joint-
tenancy account that could be enforced if contested by 
any interested party. In this matter there was no clear 
and convincing evidence found in the transcript of the 
proceedings and not even a preponderance of the evi-
dence; that from either standpoint — eventuary or un-
der the legal aspect — a trust could be found. 
If such a trust, j s found to be legally established, 
then it is^Phsmi&! contention that the Court would be 
unable to determine the intent of the trustor from the 
evidence offered and such could not be enforced. The 
Court cannot substitute its intention for that of the 
trustor. If, however, the Court finds a valid trust and 
is able to ascertain the intention of the trustor from the 
evidence, then Defendant contends that the Court was 
arbitrary and capricious in distributing the funds in 
equal shares to each of the children and refusing to give 
credence to the alleged statement "Mary is to have a 
little for her arthritis." Her arthritis is real and becom-
ing progressively worse and more expensive. This could 
amount to large sums over the period of her life span 
and the Court should have made a determination as to 
what a reasonable amount would have been. 
It seems obvious that Lucy created exactly what 
she wanted to — a joint-tenancy account with Mary P. 
Walker. Lucy left an estate in addition to the joint-ten-
ancy accounts at her death, which said estate is in the 
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process of being probated and will be distributed to her 
children. There would be no logical reason to leave part 
in joint-tenancy to be divided among her children and a 
separate estate to be divided among her children. 
We respectfully submit that the trial court should 
be reversed and that Mary P. Walker, the Defendant, 
declared to be the sole owner of the joint-tenancy funds; 
or that failing, the case be remanded to the lower court 
for a new trial, for the purpose of determining what is 
a reasonable sum for Mary's arthritis and based upon 
competent evidence in what proportions and to whom 
the balance should be divided. 
Respectfully submitted, 
IRA A. HUGGINS & 
I. GORDON HUGGINS OF 
HUGGINS & HUGGINS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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